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Abstract: French monetary control over their colonies in Africa did not decrease after 
decolonization. Instead, the monetary union, the CFA Franc Zone set the stage for French 
domination of West Africa for decades to come through their control of pricing and exchange 
rates. This dominion causes repeated economic downturns, which the governments of the CFA 
countries are unable to counteract due to the monetary and fiscal restrictions placed upon them 
through the currency union. These downturns are only offset by repeated injections of capital, 
which can only come from abroad. In a case study of France and the Ivory Coast, France is 
content to provide these funds through economic development tools such as Foreign Direct 
Investment and Bilateral Foreign Aid funds. This comes at a cost, however, as these funds 
impede the economies of the CFA Franc zone. 
Key Words: France, Ivory Coast, CFA Franc Zone, Foreign Direct Investment, Foreign Aid, 
Neocolonialism, Colonialism 
Introduction 
This study is an exploration of the aftermath of colonialism, and how the economic and 
political structures imposed on host countries are simply tools for the imperial nation post-
independence. The argument in favor of colonialism is usually that without Europeans, Africans 
(and other colonial peoples) would be even further backward than they are today. By examining 
the economic status of the African nation Côte d’Ivoire (henceforth Ivory Coast) within its 
historical and larger political and cultural context, this study considers the Ivory Coast’s 
relationship with its former colonizer, France. Crucially, post-independence Ivory Coast was to 
maintain ties with France through the CFA Franc currency zone. Through the economic and 
political control granted by the CFA Franc Zone, France is able to enforce policies which both 
hamper African domestic governments in economic downturns, as well as allow for the relatively 
unrestricted flow of capital. The restrictions on CFA domestic governments such as the Ivory 
Coast mean that economic downturns cannot be offset by fiscal spending. The injection of 
capital into the Ivory Coast economy instead comes from abroad (mostly France) through 
economic development tools such as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and bilateral foreign aid. 
The unrestricted flow of capital allows for FDI profits to be diverted back to France, thereby 
7 
 
hampering the capitalistic economy that was installed by the French during colonialism. Foreign 
aid funds were used by France to expand their economy further, rather than to aid the ailing 
economies of the CFA Franc Zone. Thus, the post-colonial relationship between France and her 
former colonies is one of further exploitation and appropriation of profits under the friendly 
guise of economic development. 
Basic Facts and Information 
The Ivory Coast is a country on the West coast of Africa. Its southern border is formed by the 
Gulf of Guinea and it is flanked by other former French colonies: Mali, Burkina Faso, and 
Guinea. It also borders with the former British colony Ghana and Liberia, where African-
Americans were freed and held on to political power. The Ivory Coast’s coastline helps with the 
transportation of exports, which are almost all agricultural in nature. Apart from the coast, the 
country is contains a now reduced equatorial forest due to excessive forestry: wood products 
only account for around 1.2% of all exports in 2017 (OEC). Meanwhile, the cleared cultivated 
land close to the Ghanaian border that formed plantations in the colonial period and the savannah 
to the north account for the rest of the exports, which include cocoa products (55.13%), rubber 
(12%), oil (11%), and vegetable products (9.4%). It is about the size of New Mexico, with an 
area of 322,463 km2 and in 2015, its total population was reported as 23.7 million. French is the 
official language, although Dioula, Baoulé, Dan, Ayin, and Senari are indigenous languages that 
are widely in use. The population consists of a Muslim majority and a large Christian population 
along with a sizeable group (25%) that practices animist religions. (nationsonline.org). In its 
profile of the country, the BBC states that “[d]espite the instability, Ivory Coast is the world's 
largest exporter of cocoa beans, and its citizens enjoy a relatively high level of income compared 
to other countries in the region” (Ivory Coast Country Profile). However, the country is far too 
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reliant on agricultural products. Price shocks to one of the Ivory Coast’s top exports immediately 
hinders the economy, as seen in the decline in cocoa prices in 2017: “As a result, the budget 
deficit increased to 4.2% of GDP, but it improved to an estimated 3.8% in 2018. Public debt 
increased to 48.2% of GDP in 2018, driven by Eurobond issuances in 2017 and 2018. The risk of 
debt distress remains moderate. Inflation was low, at an estimated 0.5% in 2018, down from 
1.0% in 2017. The current account deficit widened to an estimated 2.7% of GDP in 2018 from 
1.8% in 2017. (“Côte d’ivoire Economic Outlook” 
There is no doubt that this economic profile is hugely affected by the various forms of 
political unrest well after this country’s independence, from the one in 1999 through various 
clashes between rebels and the government in the early 2000s, to the dramatic fight for power 
between Alassane Ouattara and Laurent Gbabgo at the end of the first decade of this century, 
which resulted in Ouattara winning but Gbabgo’s supporters boycotting the vote. It has faced Al 
Quaeda attacks (2016) and charges of illegal deforestation (2017) although reconciliation has 
been ongoing with the acquittal of Gbagbo of charges of crimes against humanity by the 
International Criminal Court just this year. Despite its share of political upheaval, this country 
has a relatively stable agricultural economy formed by the French and thus offers an opportunity 
to understand how a postcolonial relationship with France has developed.  
Wider Historical, Political, and Cultural Underpinnings of Colonialism 
When Europeans first stepped foot on the shores of Africa, they believed that there was 
an obvious lack of civilization when they compared their culture to what they saw. They based 
these assertions on what they saw as Africans’ lack of morality in their customs, primitive or 
undeveloped technology, and inferior or lacking religion. Empires such as France, England, and 
the Netherlands cited their own moral and technological superiority in order to justify the 
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economic and military repression they wreaked on non-European people. Simultaneously, 
missionaries would introduce Christianity to the dominated populations, supposedly taking care 
of Africans’ souls. Colonialists of all European nations continue to view the introduction of 
civilization, industrialization, as well as their capitalist export-oriented market structure as 
positive externalities of their assuming control of Africa.  
 While it may be the case that colonialism forced African civilizations to modernize and 
enter the international sphere, the negative effects of this have been steadily draining the 
continent of its resources, not to mention the horrendous state of the native population. This case 
study will focus on France and the Ivory Coast, revealing specifically how France continues to 
profit (and will continue to profit) long after the end of colonialism. In fact, France’s domination 
of Ivory Coast during its century-odd years of colonialism ensured the continuation of economic 
dominion long after Ivoirian independence in 1960. The wider colonial context helps to situate 
Ivory Coast’s history in its relationship to France.  
 By the time France’s African colonies started to gain their independence, around the 
1960s, the French had installed a leading class of African elite. This elite class was assimilated 
into French culture, which assured the maximum compliance post-independence. Frantz Fanon, 
the Martinican intellectual, who was part of this elite class from his region, studied the plight of 
the assimilated black elites in his early critical essay (Black Skin, White Masks). In his later book, 
he made very strong criticism of the elites and likened them to the new colonizer from within. 
The promise of assimilation for Africans was that if they learned French language and culture 
and could become “civilized,” they could be French. The educational system established in 
colonies and overseas territories played an important role in creating these elites who believed in 
10 
 
French civilization even when they were against colonialism. Fanon understood the pitfalls of 
this promise of so-called progress that was France’s trap for Africa:  
The recession of yellow fever and the advance of evangelization form part of the same 
balance sheet. But the triumphant communiqués from the missions are in fact a source of 
information concerning the implantation of foreign influences in the core of the colonized 
people. I speak of the Christian religion, and no one need be astonished. The Church in 
the colonies is the white people's Church, the foreigner's Church. She does not call the 
native to God's ways but to the ways of the white man, of the master, of the oppressor. 
And as we know, in this matter many are called but few chosen (Wretched of the Earth 
41). 
What Fanon means is that political control by the colonists and the spread of Christianity are not 
two separate issues. The Church helps colonialism get established and makes the people believe 
in assimilation. But very few Africans can actually be part of French culture. The policy of 
assimilation theoretically differentiated French from British colonial rule. As Dwayne Woods, 
professor of Political Science at Purdue University writes: “[w]hile the British were apt to run 
their colonies indirectly by maintaining as much of the former pre-colonial structure as possible, 
the French were determined to assimilate their African subjects into the mainstream of French 
civilization” (Woods 95). 
Fanon also criticizes “native” intellectuals who don’t become part of the people through a 
revolutionary movement. They are still attached to the colonialists and they help with continued 
exploitation after colonialism: 
We find intact in [the intellectuals] the manners and forms of thought picked up during 
their association with the colonialist bourgeoisie. Spoilt children of yesterday's 
colonialism and of today's national governments, they organize the loot of whatever 
national resources exist. Without pity, they use today's national distress as a means of 
getting on through scheming and legal robbery, by import-export combines, limited 
liability companies, gambling on the stock exchange, or unfair promotion. They are 
insistent in their demands for the nationalization of commerce, that is to say the 
reservation of markets and advantageous bargains for nationals only. As far as doctrine is 
concerned, they proclaim the pressing necessity of nationalizing the robbery of the nation 
(Fanon 47). 
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Therefore, although we might criticize the colonists for continuing a form of domination through 
economic measures, it is important to realize that within the nation there is likely a set of elites 
who are equally exploitative and who of the same elite class as those cooperating with the former 
colonizer in fleecing the nation.  
 This more general situation across French Africa with regard to the creation of an elite is 
described in specificity for Ivory Coast by Dwayne Woods: “A small group of Africans, often 
sons of important chiefs, acquired some formal education during the colonial period. The Ivorian 
colonial elite received their training at L'ecole William Ponty in Senegal, where they came into 
contact with Africans from other French territories” (Woods 95). The training of these elites had 
a lasting impact on “…the country's internal political structure and national identity, and it linked 
it intimately with politico-economic developments in France” (Woods 95). It is thus clear that 
colonialism laid the ground for continued control of Ivory Coast by France well past the African 
nation’s independence, and that France’s economic hold in Ivory Coast was cultivated through 
political and cultural means.  
The stark choices that the new nations faced after gaining independence were as follows: 
First, that the African state in question would be completely independent of France, and along 
with total independence, they would lose trade routes and preferred access to markets in France 
(the only markets they had access to as a result of colonialism).1 The second option was a less 
radical (some might say superficial) separation, in which the newly-independent state agrees to 
France maintaining a degree of control in the country. Naturally, the French-educated elite are 
                                                          
1An example of a country that severed ties with France early on is Haiti. A comparison between 
Haiti and the other Caribbean islands which chose French citizenship (Martinique, Guadeloupe) 
shows that though Haiti is much poorer, the other islands have little to no production that goes on 
after the sugar industries have died.  
12 
 
keen not to sever ties with France, because their whole identity is shaped by French values. They 
would also fear that in a climate that favors indigenous culture, they would fall out of favor and 
lose their status. These psychological factors that exert pressure on the ruling class help France to 
maintain control in the new political and economic systems. Beyond this, France's enduring 
influence in Africa “has also virtually guaranteed a dozen or so sympathetic partners in the 
United Nations and has helped justify its permanent seat on the Security Council” (Noble). It 
becomes clear how a postcolonial nation cannot escape such a network of influence and assert 
itself as an economic entity.  
France’s control is also assured through the formation of the CFA Franc zone, which 
established French veto membership on the newly-founded monetary boards that covered West 
and Central Africa. This allowed the French to have last say on monetary economic policies 
pertaining to the movement of capital in and out of the Ivory Coast. Some of these policies were 
in reference to Foreign Direct Investment (private French investment/ownership of Ivoirian 
capital) and some to bilateral foreign aid (the flow of aid from France to the Ivory Coast). 
Through this monetary control over these so called economic development tools, France has 
been able to continue to accrue profits in the Ivory Coast as it has done over large parts of its 
former colonial empire in Africa.  
Beyond Modernization and Dependency? 
 Modernization theory, which had its moment in the 1950s and 60s is an economic theory 
rooted in capitalism, and thus is “about Africa following the developmental footsteps of Europe 
(largely the former colonizer of Africa)” (Matunhu 65). The problem is that this initiative that 
was then taken forward by brute force completely ignores the many technical superiorities in 
Africa, which had set up various kingdoms in the continent. In many ways, modernization theory 
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ignores cultural, social, and geographic specificities when measuring change. One clear 
indication of this weakness is seen in the failure of the SAPs (Structural Adjustment Policies) 
brought to Africa by the IMF (Matunhu 67). Most colonists and colonial sympathizers believe 
that Africans needed saving, citing “lack of civilization” as well as their poor living standards. 
These modernization theorists believe that colonists did more good than harm, as they provided 
infrastructure that would introduce Africa to the world economy. The most logical reason for 
modernization theory’s failure is provided by Reid, who indicates that modernization did not 
bring improvement for the poor in developing countries and that it makes not sense to adopt this 
when in fact it condemns “millions of people to starvation and despair.” (Reid 47-49). On the 
other side of the political spectrum, Dependency theory states that this infrastructure so 
gratuitously provided by colonizers was simply for resource extraction and profit, and that post-
independence African countries continue to be inferior and subordinate to Western powers. 
Walter Rodney’s view is that the development of Europe occurred because of the exploitation of 
Africa through the repatriation of profits, the lack of decision-making and investment power. 
Frantz Fanon, the Martinican psychiatrist who was sent to Algeria by the French government 
ended up abandoning his position at the Blida-Joinville hospital when faced with the atrocities of 
the colonists he was supposed to treat, and taking up arms with the FLN (National Liberation 
Front), the anticolonial organization in that country. He explains the way the economic interest 
of the “mother country” plays out historically through capitalism: 
Capitalism, in its early days, saw in the colonies a source of raw materials which, once 
turned into manufactured goods, could be distributed on the European market. After a 
phase of accumulation of capital, capitalism has today come to modify its conception of 
the profit-earning capacity of a commercial enterprise. The colonies have become a 
market. The colonial population is a customer who is ready to buy goods; consequently, 
if the garrison has to be perpetually reinforced, if buying and selling slackens off, that is 
to say if manufactured and finished goods can no longer be exported, there is clear proof 
that the solution of military force must be set aside. A blind domination founded on 
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slavery is not economically speaking worthwhile for the bourgeoisie of the mother 
country. The monopolistic group within this bourgeoisie does not support a government 
whose policy is solely that of the sword. What the factoryowners and finance magnates of 
the mother country expect from their government is not that it should decimate the 
colonial peoples, but that it should safeguard with the help of economic conventions their 
own "legitimate interests." (Wretched of the Earth 64). 
 In the Ivory Coast, the French-educated African elite assumed power in 1960 under a 
new constitution which resembled the 1958 Constitution of the French Fifth Republic, the same 
system currently in place in both France and the Ivory Coast: 
The new Ivorian constitution rejected parliamentarianism and created institutions that had 
a remarkable resemblance to those of France. Most important is the fact that the new 
constitution established a Guallist system of government with an imperial presidency that 
lacked effective checks on the power of the executive. Although the constitution created a 
Supreme Court, the latter had no power of judicial review, executive control and 
domination of the court was assured mainly because the President of the Republic was 
also the appointing authority of the head of the Supreme Court. In essence, the 
constitution subordinated the judiciary system to the imperial president, the same person 
who was supposed to guarantee the court’s independence (Kimenyi) 
Thus France, who had already doomed Ivoirians to a century of misery due to colonization, 
subjected another generation of Ivoirians to a government unable to operate transparently and 
independently without imperial oversight. As Kenneth Noble wrote in a 1994 New York Times 
article, “The French response to the fact that decolonization had reduced it to a medium-sized 
power was to vigorously sustain and strengthen its authority in Africa” (Noble). Among the 
Ivory Coast’s biggest woes is corruption in its government of African elites, who were and are 
pro-French simply because of opportunities handed to them historically: by the French 
government before independence to continue pre-colonial hierarchies in which they were already 
privileged. The point to be noted is that Africa’s leaders are also responsible for the decisions 
that keep it in dependency to Europe. A utopian theory that might or might not hold some 
answers to these problems is the African Renaissance theory, which suggests that Africans have 
to think outside these models and be more in touch with their own values and ideas and find 
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solutions through micro-level development and poverty reduction. One of the leaders in Africa 
Thomas Mbeki, who was South Africa’s president after apartheid, believes that globalization can 
actually help with achieving these goals and distancing Africa from its former colonizers (see 
Rok Ajulu). Although this theory is beyond the scope of the present study, it highlights the point 
that economic development has to take account of a wider context of historical, cultural, and 
political realities.  
When the French government decided to commission studies to determine the overall 
balance of the economic advantage between France and the former colonies, they proved that 
France had continued to take advantage: “the Gorse Report of 1971, has been so caustic in its 
criticisms of the way France has structured its 'developmental policies in Africa to the 
disadvantage of its poorer allies, that the Government has refused to make its findings publicly 
available, even to members of its own Parliament” (Joseph 6). When a government withholds a 
report on its own actions, there is clearly something there that they do not want the public to find 
out. The fact that even France’s own parliament was not allowed to view the results of the report 
may point to the fact that the developmental policies that France had enforced in Africa were not 
for the benefit of Africans, but rather a direct purveyor of French private and public interests. 
These developmental policies include Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign aid, two of the 
most profitable development policies (for France, not the Ivory Coast) both of which will be 
evaluated in this case study along with the functioning of the CFA Franc.  
Setting the Stage for Neocolonialism in Today’s Economy 
 Regardless of France’s obvious benefit during colonialism, the periods before and after 
Ivory Coast’s independence provide insight into what that independence actually meant for 
Franco-Ivoirian relations. Richard Joseph studies this period in Ivory Coast’s economic history at 
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Northwestern University, and is able to discern what France did not want the world to see. 
Before the Ivory Coast’s independence in 1960, one would expect a gradual disengagement of 
French power within the Ivory Coast. Instead, there is a “considerable increase in its economic 
entrenchment, and in the structuring of the peripheral economies to accord with [France’s] own 
interests” (Joseph 13). This period of 1945-60 signified the beginning of African independence 
from European rule. It soon became clear that with conflicts occurring within many African 
states, it was time for those European countries to begin to sever ties. In France’s case, this never 
occurred: “At the point of handing over power in 1959-60, the independent regimes were made 
to sign on the dotted line a set of agreements intended to ensure that the political, cultural and 
fiscal superstructures of the countries would protect and camouflage the economic basis carefully 
implanted” (Joseph 13). This economic basis was formed throughout France’ colonization of the 
Ivory Coast, and cemented through independence agreements. Such agreements made it 
impossible for the Ivory Coast to make any major political or economic decisions without the 
okay from their French counterparts. Unfortunately for the Ivory Coast, this meant that a 
continuation of the extraction of resources would continue, albeit under a different name: trade. 
Again, Fanon, who died before Ivory Coast’s independence, is useful for his prophetic words: 
The former dominated country becomes an economically dependent country. The ex-
colonial power, which has kept intact and sometimes even reinforced its colonialist trade 
channels, agrees to provision the budget of the independent nation by small injections. 
Thus we see that the accession to independence of the colonial countries places an 
important question before the world, for the national liberation of colonized countries 
unveils their true economic state and makes it seem even more unendurable. The 
fundamental duel which seemed to be that between colonialism and anticolonialism, and 
indeed between capitalism and socialism, is already losing some of its importance. What 
counts today, the question which is looming on the horizon, is the need for a 
redistribution of wealth. Humanity must reply to this question, or be shaken to pieces by 
it. (Fanon, Wretched of the Earth 97). 
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In the end, any interest in development theories or strategies in Africa should be focused on the 
need for a redistribution of wealth over the globe. This study focuses on the Ivory Coast and 
three main issues (the CFA Franc, FDI, and Bilateral lending) that structure its economy with a 
view to understanding why Africa continues to be caught in a circle of dependency (and poverty, 
despite pockets of wealth), long after the exploitative system of colonialism has ended. 
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Chapter One: A Monetary Union: The CFA Franc 
At the end of World War II, international ties were strengthened following the imperial 
nature of Hitler and the Axis’ power grab. In the economic sphere, this was accomplished 
through the Bretton Woods agreements, which established the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank as well as forming a new international monetary system of exchange 
rates. France was one of the forty-four allied nations represented at the Bretton Woods 
conference, and thus was able to ratify the CFA Franc zone into existence. This monetary union 
consists of fifteen African countries divided into three sub unions. The first is the Western 
African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), consisting of the Ivory Coast, Senegal, 
Burkina Faso, Mali, Benin, Niger, Togo, and Guinea Bissau. The second union within the CFA 
Franc zone is the Central African Monetary Union (CAMU), consisting of Cameroon, Chad, 
Gabon, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and the Central African Republic. The fifteenth country is the 
Islamic Federal Republic of Comoros which has its own currency. All three sub unions have 
their own central bank, and issue their own currency, but all three currencies are equivalent, and 
were pegged to the French Franc. A more recent agreement caused the CFA Franc to have a 
fixed exchange rate with the euro. Countries within the CFA Franc zone such as the Ivory Coast 
are largely export-oriented due to French colonialism. In export economies, changes the price of 
natural resources or goods can often define exchange rates. Within the CFA Franc zone, 
however, France guarantees a fixed exchange rate, and absorbs deficits. This benefit is small 
compared to what France gained through the formation of this monetary union, which will be 
shown through the example of the Ivory Coast. 
In a study from the journal Economic Modelling, Gianluigi Giorgioni attempts to single 
out the causes of economic and political strife in the Ivory Coast. Written in 2000, Giorgioni is 
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unable to witness the next ten years of further strife. However, he is able to document the extent 
of the effect of policies instituted by France through the CFA Franc Zone. The terms of trade 
instituted by France through the CFA Franc Zone as well as deflationary policies both played an 
important role in causing the poor economic performance seen in the Ivory Coast. However, the 
negative effects because of these policies were nothing compared to what the Ivoirian 
government was unable to do because of French interference in the CFA Franc Zone. Not only 
did France cause economic crises in the Ivory Coast, they also prevented Ivoirians from 
lessening the damage caused by those crises through monetary policy.  
 The Ivory Coast is the largest economy in the CFA zone, and has been seen as an 
example of a successful post-colonial export economy. However, the economy of the Ivory 
Coast has had a series of shocks, and the economic performance documented by many is 
undermined because of French involvement on the monetary boards and central banks of the 
CFA Franc Zone. Relations between France and the Ivory Coast have continued in the same vein 
as the resource-extraction model formed by colonialists. France veto membership on Ivoirian 
monetary boards has had a devastating effect on the Ivoirian economy. Ivoirians were subjected 
to exploitation through French exclusive access to Ivoirian markets and pricing of Ivoirian goods 
enforced by the CFA Franc zone, and further hurt economically because of France’s deflationary 
policies. In addition to these external forces, the Ivory Coast is limited in its ability to deal with 
economic downturns caused by these external forces. The CFA Franc Zone forces its members to 
adhere to monetary and fiscal limitations which come from the monetarily integrated EU zone. 
All of these factors contribute to the need for devaluations in the CFA Franc Zone, which cause 
further distress to the Ivoirian economy.  
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Exploitation through French Pricing and Access to Markets 
When France colonized what is now the Ivory Coast, they found a civilization that was 
separate from the market. People did not think as much in terms of profit, but rather subsistence. 
Living off of the land was commonplace, and the need for growing more than what was locally 
necessary was not present. Once the French colonized, an economy was forced out of a 
subsistence lifestyle. Given that there had been no industrial revolution, the economy generated 
by the French on the backs of the Ivoirians had to be based off of the agricultural potential of 
Ivoirian land. This led the Ivoirian economy to become export-centric. The exports which 
dominate the Ivoirian economy are not sustainability goods, but rather cash crops: 
In fact, Cote d’Ivoire has become heavily specialized in cocoa… Cote d’Ivoire’s cocoa 
production grew to over 1.4 million metric tons in 2000; it is the world’s leading 
producer. Over the years, Cote d’Ivoire has devoted an ever-increasing amount of land to 
cocoa output. Cote d’Ivoire’s share of world output grew from less than 7% in 1960 to 
over 41% in 2000. Raw cocoa now dominates the Ivorian economy and exports, even 
more than in the past.  Figure 8 below shows data which supports this claim. By 2000, 
raw cocoa was 80% of the country’s commodity exports, over 50% of all exported goods 
and services, and 21% of the entire GDP.  When one considers that a great deal of output 
and economic activity in other sectors is cocoa-related, it is clear that this country has 
become quite dependent upon one raw commodity, cocoa (Noer 9). 
Indeed to this day, over fifty percent of the Ivory Coast’s exports are made up of cocoa products 
(OEC). This had devastating effects on the population, who saw their land converted into 
farmland and received no form of compensation to help introduce them into the market. In the 
long term, this specialization  
 Deviations in world cocoa prices are detrimental to say the least given the degree of the Ivory 
Coast’s reliance on cocoa. On the surface, the CFA Franc Zone largely benefited the Ivory 
Coast’s export economy. African goods had been guaranteed prices in France which resided 
above the world prices. However, French veto power on monetary boards meant that Ivoirians 
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were forced into a dependency for French goods, which ranged “…from 23 to 105 per cent 
above world prices, easily cancelling French concessions in the other direction” (Joseph 9). 
These reciprocal free market arrangements not only ensure that Ivoirians have to sell to France, 
but also that Ivoirians must buy from France even when a cheaper good is available from a 
different source. This is encapsulated in the figures for current account to GDP ratios (Giorgioni 
536): 
 
Since France molded the Ivory Coast economy, it has had a largely negative current account to 
GDP ratio. This ratio measures the international competitiveness of a country’s exported goods. 
Given the fact that the Ivory Coast is an emerging economy, the costs of production should be 
low enough that they have a comparative advantage in agricultural goods. That is, that they are 
able to sell their agricultural goods (cocoa) at a lower price than the world price. Unfortunately, 
due to the CFA Franc Zone, the Ivory Coast was forced to export goods using an overvalued 
currency. In addition, Ivoirians had to pay higher prices than world prices for necessary goods 
from France.  
This is just one of the many ways in which France exploited the Ivory Coast post-
independence. However, the Ivoirian economy has had a better outlook in recent years. This may 
be because France does not dominate the Ivory Coast in trade as much as they did before the 
1994 devaluation: “In 1960, France took 52% of Cote d’Ivoire’s exports and supplied 69% of 
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imports. By 2000, France took 14% of exports and supplied 18% of imports.  In 2000, France 
had been displace by Nigeria as top import trade partner. Nigeria supplied 25% of Cote 
d’Ivoire’s imports in 2000, primarily petroleum” (Noer 7). In addition to Nigeria, the Ivory Coast 
has expanded their international presence by forming trade links with non-African emerging 
economies. These links with countries such as China, Russia, India, Brazil, Korea, and Taiwan 
took up 12% of total exports in 2000. “Overall, Cote d’Ivoire’s trade links are expanding and 
diversifying.  Numerous new customers buy Cote d’Ivoire’s products, and numerous new 
suppliers provide her imports. The old picture of Cote d’Ivoire as linked by trade almost 
exclusively to France is much less true than it used to be” (Noer 7). This depletion of the reliance 
of the Ivory Coast’s economy on France allows Ivoirian companies to obtain world prices on 
their imports, as opposed to paying more for them from France. 
The Inability to Right the Ship: Fiscal and Monetary Limitations Forced on the Ivory Coast 
through the CFA Franc Zone 
The Ivory Coast along with the rest of the CFA Franc Zone suffers from a lack of control 
over their domestic economic functions.  French veto membership on central banks within the 
CFA Franc Zone as well as the monetary limitations enforced by the zone cause the Ivoirian 
government to be ill-suited in dealing with economic downturns. Unfortunately, economic 
downturns were prevalent given the unfair terms of trade between France and the Ivory Coast. 
During economic downturns, the government has an obligation to negate the negative impact 
these downturns have on the population. If a recession is left unchecked it can spiral into a more 
serious economic depression. Economic downturns cause businesses to fire workers, leading to 
more unemployment. This reduces the spending power of the population, which diminishes 
firm’s profit expectations, which could lead to further unemployment. This spiral is only negated 
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by government action, as fiscal policy would be employed by increasing government spending. 
However, the CFA Franc zone places strict limitations on government deficits. CFA countries 
are forced to adhere to the same restrictions placed on France by the European monetary union 
(EU). These restrictions include the prohibition of monetary financing, as well as limitations on 
fiscal debt. 
Devaluations of the CFA Franc; Implications for the Populations of CFA Countries 
 The valuation of the CFA Franc was overvalued from the start. French colonists left 
behind an export-oriented economy that could not get the best prices abroad as a result of both 
their currency and French preferred access to markets. The population further suffered because 
of the limitations forced on CFA governments in terms of fiscal and monetary policy during 
recessions. It was obvious there was a structural problem leading up to the 1994 devaluation of 
the CFA Franc: “Between 1981 and 1993, the population living below the poverty line 
(corresponding to less than $1.25 per day, according to the World Bank) increased from 46.95% 
to 52.47% of the total population of the CFA Franc Zone” (Kiendrebeago 5421) This period 
leading up to the 1994 devaluation showed clear signs that the CFA Franc was overvalued. “The 
real price of raw cocoa grew from the early years to a peak in 1976 and then declined; at the 
same time Cote d’Ivoire’s output per worker followed the same boom-and-bust profile. Cocoa 
prices are volatile (Noer 9). Thus, France’s colonial control over the Ivory Coast resulted in an 
export economy which is extremely vulnerable to changes in world prices. 
 It is clear that France’s integration into the African monetary system was not beneficial 
economically for Africans. However, that is not the end of the CFA Franc’s woes deposited upon 
Ivoirians and other West/Central Africans. One of the structural flaws with the CFA Franc 
system is that it gave African members an overvalued currency, which destroyed any 
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competitiveness that was possible in the export market. In addition, it tied all CFA countries’ 
economies with France’s economy. The overvaluation of the CFA Franc became “…evident in 
the course of the 1980s and led to an economic crisis that culminated in the devaluation in 1994 
of the CFA franc” (Masson and Pattillo 22-23). This devaluation was catastrophic not just to the 
economy, but to the well-being of millions. In a 1994 article of the New York Times, the reality 
of everyday Ivoirians was that prices of everyday necessities doubled while their salaries 
remained the same. 
Nearly a month after the value of the African franc was suddenly and sharply cut in half 
when France bowed to Western pressure to end what amounted to a subsidy, people are 
trying to adapt to painful price increases for nearly everything they eat and drink. Prices 
for pharmaceutical products, nearly all of which are imported, have soared. The cost of 
drugs for malaria, the continent's biggest killer, have nearly doubled in some places, 
putting them out of reach of many Africans (Noble).  
Not only did the average person suffer, but private suppliers suffered as well. Due to the 
devaluation, the government introduced price ceilings for some of the most important goods, 
resulting in a cutback in life-saving product on the shelves at higher prices. This time period was 
when the CFA Franc zone was at its most vulnerable. The value of the CFA Franc was 
guaranteed from the signing of the currency union, and reiterated consistently by both French 
and Ivoirian leaders. As close to the signing as December of 1993, “Michel Roussin, The French 
Cooperation Minister and head of the main aid department told the Senate: ‘There is no question 
of devaluing the C.F.A. franc, for we are very attached to the Franc Zone” (Noble). In addition, 
“Many Africans, moreover, say they believe that the French held off on their action until the 
death of President Felix Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, a former French Government 
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Minister, a formidable opponent of devaluation, and a symbol of the close ties with France” 
(Noble). The valuation of the CFA franc was up in the air for a long time, thereby nullifying 
some of the few positive externalities of the monetary union. “The 1994 devaluation was a major 
event that risked destroying the CFA franc zones. The decision to devalue came after years of 
wrangling; devaluation was advocated early on by the IMF and World Bank but resisted by both 
the French and African authorities. France signaled a change in its position at a meeting of the 
Franc zone in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, in September 1993, when it made clear that it would only 
provide aid to countries having agreed to programs with the Bretton Woods institutions (the IMF 
and World Bank)” (Masson and Pattillo 24). This allowed for less regulations for increased 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), which will be discussed in chapter 2.  
The first condition given to newly-independent African entities for continued French 
relations post-independence was a monetary condition. Former French colonial territories were 
to continue to use the CFA Franc under a currency union, although countries such as the Ivory 
Coast have far from benefited from this tool of French power. Through their lack of monetary 
sovereignty, countries in the CFA zone automatically lose control of their economy. While the 
currency used would maintain its exchange with France, the loss of control over capital 
entering/leaving the country did nothing to dissuade France from continuing to accrue Ivoirian 
resources. Since France is on the monetary boards in the CFA zone, there are little to no laws on 
the movement of capital between France and the Ivory Coast. This “…has demonstrably acted to 
the benefit of French firms, free to repatriate their local profits, as well as the small indigenous 
Frenchifi’ed elites who have divided their periods of residence between Paris and the local 
capitals. Reliable estimates indicate that these transfers back to France have exceeded French 
public and private investments in the periphery” (Joseph 7). Despite the advantages that access to 
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French markets are supposed to provide, the Ivoirian economy has not benefited from this 
agreement in the slightest. The final implication of the CFA Franc zone which has continued to 
limit Ivoirian economic health and promote France’s interests is the principle of free capital 
transfer within the franc zone. This has allowed emergence of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
and Bilateral foreign aid, which have only aided France in her bid to profit as much as possible 
off of the Ivoirian economy. While they may be seen as economic development tools, FDI and 
foreign aid only have a negative impact on the African economy. These negative impacts will be 
explored in the next two sections on FDI and bilateral foreign aid respectively. 
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Chapter Two: Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
 In the colonial period, France owned the totality of Ivoirian industry through force. In the 
postcolonial period, France retains control through economic and political means. France 
maintains control over monetary boards throughout their CFA Franc Zone. This currency zone 
acts as a tool in France’s economic interests. This can be compared to the British form of 
postcolonial relationships with former colonies. In parts of the former British Empire such as 
India and other African colonies like Ghana managed to nationalize the forms of production left 
behind. Former French colonies, however, were coerced into maintaining economic and political 
ties with their former colonies. As discussed in the previous chapter on the CFA franc zone, 
French veto membership on CFA monetary boards allowed France to control the flow of capital 
to and from the Ivory Coast. France exhibits an elite form of neocolonialism, as they are able to 
profit in a manner which seems as if it was for economic development. Foreign Direct 
Investment is one such tool through which France profits off of what is supposed to be economic 
development. There are two main theoretical views on the effects of Foreign Direct Investment 
on the receiving country. The first view is that Foreign Direct Investment (henceforth referred to 
as FDI) would offer much needed capital to struggling economies, and with it would come 
technology and economic knowledge. The opposing view is that FDI has a detrimental effect on 
the receiving economy because of the repatriation of profits. The goal of any business in the 
capitalist system is to make profits. The goal of firms investing in less developed countries is to 
make profit, and send those profits back to the home country. When the profits of injected capital 
are exported, the host country loses capital which could have been accumulated and/or invested. 
This results in a negative investment multiplier. “As is evident, the interests of foreign capital 
and of the African peoples clearly do not coincide… While the African governments welcome 
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investment in [the manufacturing sector], (it permits the partial solution of the employment 
problem and a reduction in losses on the export of raw materials), at the same time they must 
reconcile themselves to the fact that the Western companies reap fabulous profits from the 
exploitation of the indigenous work force” (Vyotskaia 14). To put things into perspective, France 
partially causes the economic downturns undergone by the Ivoirian population through unfair 
pricing and strict bilateral trade flows, then prohibits the Ivoirian government from remediating 
the situation because of fiscal and monetary restrictions. This prompts the need for “economic 
development,” which most firms in developed countries are happy to do as long as the capital 
going into these countries brings out profit. Foreign Direct Investment is one such type of 
economic development which is used by developed countries to increase their Gross National 
Products. Unfortunately, any tool used for economic development that generates profit for the 
donor of capital inherently does not work because the loss of the profit capital, studied further 
below.  
 Dirk Akkermans, professor of economics and business at the University of Groningen, 
researches the flow of profits from FDI in core, semi-periphery, and periphery countries in his 
paper: Net Profit flow per country from 1980 to 2009: The long-term effects of Foreign Direct 
Investment. In this study, Akkermans uses the World-systems group, which classifies countries 
into the core, semi-periphery, and periphery categories. “During 1980–2009, the period of 
neoliberalism, FDI originating from core/developed countries grew strongly. Stimulated by core 
FDI flows the period showed a clear push of core governments, [Transnational Corporations, the 
IMF, and the World Bank] to introduce institutional changes that served profit maximization: 
stronger protection of property rights, liberalization and deregulation and privatization, often 
referred to as the Washington Consensus [84,85]. Barriers to capital mobility were generally 
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lowered, making FDI and profit repatriation easier. Revision of tax rates and other FDI-friendly 
measures aimed at boosting profits (e.g. [86–88]). Strengthening property rights, in particular 
intellectual property rights (TRIPS provided more protection for investors and specifically 
stronger protection for the competitive advantage of core firms, knowledge” (Akkermans 4). The 
effects of the measures taken by developed nations in order to increase access to developing 
economies is shown in the figure below. 
 
Net Profit Flow 1980-2009 
In this paper, Akkermans finds that over time the net profit flow was largely negative for less 
developed (periphery and semi-periphery) countries and positive for developed (core) countries. 
Despite this, outward FDI flows have appeared recently from less developed countries, which is 
a possible offsetting factor for the repatriation of profits by firms from core countries. 
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Unfortunately, this is not the case: “The recently growing amount of outward FDI from 
developing countries could create a stronger profit inflow, mitigating the growing outflow. But 
besides the lack of outward FDI stock that influences the balance of inward and outward profit 
flows for developing countries negatively it is also possible that peripheral countries are drained 
by their own firms–outward FDI stock creates a negative profit flow, contrary to outward FDI 
stock of semi-peripheral and core countries” (Akkermans 5). In the figure below, it may be seen 
that regardless of whether or not outward FDI from developing countries is profit inducing, the 
growth of outward FDI stock from core countries far outweighs that of the periphery.  
 
FDI Outward Stock 
Thus it has been established that FDI only benefits core and sometimes semi-periphery countries 
in the form of repatriation of profits. Meanwhile, outward FDI from developing nations does 
nothing to augment their economy.  
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The Case of France and the Ivory Coast 
 France’s relationship with the members of the CFA Franc Zone echoes that of core and 
periphery countries described in Akkermans’ study. France ensures that the flow of capital in and 
out of the Ivory Coast and other CFA countries is uninhibited by rules or regulations. The effects 
of this are seen in both the FDI flows and the FDI stock in the Ivory Coast economy.  
FDI Flows into Ivory Coast 
Although FDI flows into the Ivory Coast are more diversified in recent years, the majority of 
investment comes from France. This can be seen in the next figure of FDI stock in the Ivory 
Coast: 
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FDI Stock in Ivory Coast 
Unsurprisingly, due to their colonial past and their neocolonial tendencies, France owns the 
largest share of the Ivoirian economy, and is showing no signs of slowing down growth. Due to 
the high rate of growth of the Ivory Coast economy, the percent of the Ivory Coast economy 
owned by French firms through FDI amounts to around 3.5%. While this may seem like a small 
number, losing profits from 3.5% of the economy every year abroad can do some damage, not to 
mention the fact that FDI is not the only way France has obtained ownership of Ivoirian land and 
resources. This should be worrying to Ivoirians given Akkermans’ findings within his study. 
Developed countries like France decrease the limitations on the movement of capital (CFA Franc 
Zone) and repatriate the profits earned off of that capital. “Recently, African states have been 
making a more active effort to wrest from the hands of multinational corporations the levers that 
permit them to use the continent's raw material and human resources as they see fit” (Vyotskaia 
13). Given Akkermans’ study, it comes as no surprise that developing countries’ governments 
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are attempting to control this repatriation of profits that is widespread across the developing 
world.  
“The establishment of control over the activity of foreign capital as one of the measures 
aimed at restricting the exploitative activity of foreign capital and the right to nationalization are 
by no means illegal, as bourgeois jurists now fairly often proclaim them to be. They stem from 
the principle of sovereignty, which gives each state the freedom to manage its own natural 
resources” (Vyotskaia13-14). Increased restrictions on the flow of capital in and out of the Ivory 
Coast is a good thing, although it has come too little too late. French ownership of the means of 
production is way too high, and the existence of the CFA Franc zone retards the Ivory Coast 
government’s ability to both deficit spend and control the repatriation of profits out of the Ivory 
Coast and into France. The final chapter will elaborate on another economic development tool 
which France’s economy is aided by: bilateral foreign aid. 
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Chapter Three: Foreign Aid 
Foreign aid is a broad categorization of a flow of goods, resources, or money from 
developed countries to those countries who are in need of economic development. These flows 
have different purposes as well as costs to developing economies. The United Nations has set a 
target for developed countries to contribute 0.7% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) towards 
Official Development Assistance (ODA), the largest flow in the set that constitutes foreign aid. 
In order to appear more respectable on the international stage, powerful, developed countries do 
contribute varying percentages of GDP towards foreign aid.  
The premise of government to government aid began after World War II with The 
Marshall Plan, when the United States gave large reconstruction loans to fourteen European 
countries. This plan was a great success, bringing economic stability as well as the “…re-
establishment of political and social institutions crucial for Western Europe’s on-going peace and 
prosperity” (Moyo 36). Eventually, the idea of spreading this practice to Africa became 
widespread, as the West used aid as a “…means by which Britain and France combined their 
new-found altruism with a hefty dollop of self-interest – maintaining strategic geopolitical holds” 
(Moyo 9). So why did this work so well in the European context, but not the developing world? 
Moyo has answers: European countries were not wholly dependent on aid, the Marshall Plan was 
finite, European countries had crucial institutions in place before the war still intact, and finally, 
the Marshall Plan was specifically targeted towards physical infrastructure. Aid never 
surmounted 3% of the GDP of any European country because they had other 
economies/resources to turn to, while African countries are lacking an economic base to 
augment. The Marshall Plan was an injection of funds in a short amount of time, whereas 
African aid has expanded infinitely, leading to higher dependency, and lower sustainable 
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production creation. In Europe, Moyo draws attention to the fact that the “Marshall Plan aid 
was… a matter of reconstruction, and not economic development” (Moyo 37). In her final 
differential point, Moyo claims that since the Marshal Plan was constrained to physical 
infrastructure, there appeared less aid dependency. This may be true, however in Africa, the need 
for physical infrastructure is relatively low. 
 
As one can see from the graph above, the relationship between foreign aid and growth in Africa 
tells a story. The more aid that has been poured into the former colonies of Africa, the less 
growth. Globally, foreign aid has its problems including reverse flows and dependency/private 
growth inhibition. Within the case of France and the Ivory Coast, private growth inhibition ends 
up the least of their problems. 
The High Cost of Aid: Reverse Flows 
In the present day, foreign aid is constituted more of grants than loans. However, in the 
late 20th century, “…aid became the tool of another political contest – the Cold War” (Moyo 14). 
The United States and other developing countries increased aid at a dizzying rate, and by the end 
of the 1980s, developing countries’ debt was at least $1 trillion. “Indeed, the cost became so 
substantial that it eventually dwarfed foreign aid going into poor countries – leading to a net 
reverse flow from poor countries to rich to the tune of US$15 billion every year between 1987 
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and 1989” (Moyo 22). Despite this, aid continued to rise. Richer countries did not differentiate 
leaders by competency, rather they gave “…aid monies even to the most corrupt and venal 
despots in Africa” (Moyo 23). Moyo claims that the structures for governance change have been 
put in place, but the implementations of these radical reforms have had little to no effect on 
countries who are dependent on aid. Some believe that despite aid’s problems, concise 
parameters/conditionalities are able to solve the shortfalls that exist because of mismanagement 
of funds. However, Moyo discounts these claims, as in the 1980s this was the strategy. “On 
paper, conditionalities made sense… In practice, however, conditionalities failed miserably. 
Paramount was their failure to constrain corruption and bad government. A World Bank study 
found that as much as 85 percent of aid flows were used for purposes other than that for which 
they were unintentionally intended, very often diverted to unproductive, if not grotesque 
ventures” (Moyo 39). Despite the validity of conditionalities in theory, without enforcement they 
do not produce results.  
Dependency/Private Growth Inhibition 
High flows of aid in the form of either goods or money are detrimental to a developing 
country’s economy. The World Bank has created a data category: Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPC). By comparing the net Official Development Aid (Aid) received by these 
HIPCs with Exports and Imports as a percent of GDP, it may be shown if these flows of aid 
increase either production or spending power: 
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Unfortunately, the rise of foreign aid is accompanied with a decrease in the growth rate of 
exports and imports. The sharp growth seen before 2000 in exports and imports is halted in its 
tracks as soon as the sharp rise in ODA funds begins. When aid in the form of goods is poured 
into a developing country, small businesses’ consumer base is destroyed, as the market is flooded 
with cheap (and free) foreign goods, completely destroying growth rates: 
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Both graphs show the same thing: foreign aid restricts growth. However, foreign aid does 
not just affect growth, as Moyo notes: “…between 1970 and 1998, when aid flows to Africa 
were at their peak, poverty in Africa rose from 11 percent to a staggering 66 percent” (Moyo 47). 
High flows of aid throw more people into poverty, and do not create any institutions/businesses 
for job-creation.  
In nearly all cases, short-term aid evaluations give the erroneous impression of aid’s 
success. But short-term evaluations are scarcely relevant when trying to tackle Africa’s 
long-term problems. Aid effectiveness should be measured against its contribution to 
long-term sustainable growth, and whether it moves the greatest number of people out of 
poverty in a sustainable way. When seen in this lens, aid is found to be wanting (Moyo 
44-5) 
 The private growth inhibition that follows mass flows of foreign aid restricts Africa’s 
lower class from rising to the middle income category: 
…in an aid environment, governments are less interested in fostering entrepreneurs and 
the development of their middle class than in furthering their own financial interests. 
Without a strong economic voice a middle class is powerless to take its government to 
task. With easy access to cash a government remains all-powerful, accountable only (and 
only then nominally) to its aid donors. Inhibited in its growth, the middle class never 
reaches that critical mass that historically has proven essential for a country’s economic 
and political success. In most functioning and healthy economies, the middle class pays 
taxes in return for government accountability. Foreign aid short-circuits this link. 
Because the government’s financial dependence on its citizens has been reduced, it owes 
its people nothing (Moyo 58). 
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Because of the inability of either developing countries’ citizens or IGOs to hold developing 
countries responsible, Africa’s lower classes remain impoverished while those who hold places 
of high political power accrue all of the wealth.  
Corruption 
Of all ODA funds worldwide, only around 25% actually reach their destination due to 
“administrative fees” of charities, and general corruption in governments around the world. In 
fact, one of the main problems with ODA flows is its positive correlation with corruption. So 
much so that some like Dambisa Moyo believe that “[t]he problem is that aid is not benign – it’s 
malignant. No longer part of the potential solution, it’s part of the problem – in fact aid is the 
problem” (Moyo 47). This chapter has systematically gone through the functional problems of 
worldwide foreign aid as an economic development tool. In the past, the amount of foreign aid 
that was constituted by loans was much larger than in the present day. Thus, lending without 
consideration of the country’s ability to pay the loan back creates a debt problem. Interest rates 
were so high, and repayment rates so low, that it led to a reverse flow of funds between 
developed and developing countries from 1987-89. High flows of foreign aid cause dependency 
in the case of developing countries as well as private growth inhibition. Finally, the high levels 
of corruption in developing countries result in foreign aid having little to no effect on poverty. 
The actual driving force behind these aid flows is much contested. The benefits for a donor 
country appear to completely outweigh the benefits for the host country as shown below. 
Benefit of aid for France, the Donor Country 
 There are functional problems of worldwide foreign aid as an economic development 
tool. In the past, the amount of foreign aid that was constituted by loans was much larger than in 
the present day. Thus, lending without consideration of the country’s ability to pay the loan back 
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creates a debt problem. Interest rates were so high, and repayment rates so low, that it led to a 
reverse flow of funds between developed and developing countries from 1987-89. High flows of 
foreign aid cause dependency in the case of developing countries as well as private growth 
inhibition. Finally, the high levels of corruption in developing countries result in foreign aid 
having little to no effect on poverty. 
These structural problems with worldwide aid are not what is focused on here. As 
discussed in previous chapters, France maintains economic and political control through the CFA 
Franc Zone. The restrictive bilateral trade policies and unfair pricing instituted by France caused 
economic downturns. The Ivoirian government was and is unable to respond to these economic 
downturns because of the fiscal and monetary restrictions placed upon them as a result of 
membership in the CFA Franc Zone. This creates the need for economic development. 
Specifically, the need for a buffer stock of capital during economic downturns. This is 
accomplished by France through FDI as well as foreign aid.  
After Ivoirian independence, French control over monetary policy did not decrease, as evidenced 
by the CFA Franc Zone. Veto control allows France to determine where bilateral foreign aid 
goes, and how it is spent. “Private companies, when asked to invest in independent countries, lay 
down conditions which are shown in practice to be inacceptable or unrealizable. Faithful to the 
principle of immediate returns which is theirs as soon as they go "overseas," the capitalists are 
very chary concerning all long-term investments… At a pinch they willingly agree to lend 
money to the young states, but only on condition that this money is used to buy manufactured 
products and machines: in other words, that it serves to keep the factories in the mother country 
going” (Fanon Wretched of the Earth 102-03). Most of the aid that is funneled into the Ivory 
Coast is used in order to further expand the France economy. Thus, France gives aid to the 
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Ivoirian government through “…French metropolitan agencies such as the FAC (Fonds d'Aide et 
de Cooperation) and the CCCE (Caisse Centrale de la Cooperation Economique)” (Joseph 9). 
However those funds are then used by African state agencies under direction from French 
supervisors in order to further French interests. This directly contradicts the very premise of 
economic development, as it is supposed to positively affect the well-being of the host country. 
These bilateral foreign aid funds were transferred to French private companies: “Up to 1970, for 
example, eight large colonial and transnational companies had procured 50 per cent of the 
CCCE's 'developmental' credits” (Joseph 9). French foreign aid to the Ivory Coast has been 
largely conditional. “For example, in 1993, 51.1% of French ODA was totally or partly 
conditional on purchases being made in the donor country. Whether individual companies 
benefit from this or not depends on whether they belong highly personalized networks, involving 
both public and private sector employees (Conte 141). This shows that bilateral foreign aid 
received by the Ivory Coast is at least partially for French self-benefit. Indeed in 1993, “…a 
study showed that out of 100 francs of French aid almost a quarter disappeared in illegal 
commissions, about 10% was used to pay French aid workers and the rest was used to buy 
French goods and services” (Alternatives economiques, 1994). Additionally, France required 
CFA members to submit to IMF regulations when borrowing funds: “…the borrowing 
government is usually required to adopt economic policies intended to improve its country’s 
economic situation. These policies typically entail fiscal austerity, tight monetary policy, and 
sometimes currency devaluation” (Vreeland 351). Unfortunately for Ivoirians, these policies do 
not work when France has control over pricing and access to markets because of the repatriation 
of profits.   
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Through the CFA Franc Zone, France institutes control over the Ivory Coast, in particular 
the market’s pricing abroad, as well as the government’s fiscal spending. This control results in 
the inability of the Ivoirian government to deal with economic downturns, which are made more 
common by the pricing system instituted by the French with their own interests in mind. These 
economic downturns result in the need for an injection of capital, which can only come from 
abroad. Given their control over the system, France ensures that these injections of capital 
originate in France. Additionally, they ensure that the overall value of these injections expands 
the French economy despite the payment of funds out of the system. A change in the way 
bilateral foreign aid works is needed in order to reverse the flow of benefit for the less developed 
nations. For instance, in food aid, a restructuring has commenced, requiring one quarter of 
American food aid to be purchased from poorer countries, thereby reducing the amount of 
American goods flooding the market. A push for more of this food aid to be purchased from 
developing nations would help reduce poverty. Perhaps it would be even more efficient to 
purchase domestic, small-scale agricultural goods with foreign aid funds and sell them back to 
the population at a lower rate or distribute as needed freely depending on the needs of the 
loan/grant repayment (or not). 
 The flows of profits have always been from the developing country into the developed 
one. In the case of France and the Ivory Coast there is no different story. The repatriation of 
profits on Foreign Direct Investments as well as the selfish nature of bilateral foreign aid cannot 
be changed unless the Ivory Coast exerts control over its own economic system. This cannot 
occur without the dissolution of the CFA Franc Zone. 
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Conclusion 
“Europe has stuffed herself inordinately with the gold and raw materials of the colonial 
countries: Latin America, China, and Africa. From all these continents, under whose eyes 
Europe today raises up her tower of opulence, there has flowed out for centuries toward that 
same Europe diamonds and oil, silk and cotton, wood and exotic products. Europe is literally the 
creation of the Third World. The wealth which smothers her is that which was stolen from the 
underdeveloped peoples. The ports of Holland, the docks of Bordeaux and Liverpool were 
specialized in the Negro slave trade, and owe their renown to millions of deported slaves” 
(Fanon Wretched of the Earth 101). 
Colonialism has had a part in the shaping of the modern day world. Economic and 
political systems have been created mostly by former colonizers which keep the status quo. In 
the case of France and the Ivory Coast, the CFA Franc Zone was created by France as a 
mechanism for keeping control and unrestricted access to markets. On the international stage, 
economic development is one of the main issues tackled by these systems across the globe. Inter-
Governmental Organizations (IGOs) such as the United Nations (UN), the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank claim to make global well-being their number one 
priority. The UN has, on two separate occasions, issued a list of goals for developing countries to 
be achieved by a certain point in time. The most recent issuance has created the Sustainable 
Development Goals, a set of seventeen goals to be targets to guide the United Nations 
Development Program’s policies until 2030. To achieve these goals, the UN mobilizes countries 
around the world to employ economic development methods such as Foreign Direct Investment 
and foreign aid. Unfortunately, these methods are simply tools for further exploitation in the case 
of France and the Ivory Coast. It is unclear if these development tools could work given certain 
parameters. In the case of Foreign Direct Investment, the host country would have to be able to 
control the way in which returns on these investments leave the country. If profits are simply 
repatriated back to the investing firms’ country, it loses all merits for development. In terms of 
foreign aid, where goods are bought makes a real difference. The host country should be able to 
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use foreign aid funds to buy goods from small time domestic producers instead of receiving 
goods from the donor country. While foreign aid in the form of goods from the donor country 
positively impacts the donor country’s economy, it negatively impacts the economy of the host 
country because of dependence and import substitution. Here is where the goals of economic 
development come into question. If it is indeed a question of morality, profits should not be 
pursued through economic development. Most of these economic development tools are simply 
injections of capital into a failing economy. These injections are necessary because of the system 
of colonialism which stripped the developing world of resources and labor, as well as the control 
over their own destiny. Through colonialism, Europeans instituted an array of policies which set 
up their colonies to be sources of economic growth for their empires for generations to come. 
One of these policies was the emergence of the idea of production to export. This market 
equation has been held onto by former colonies all over the world, continuing to produce and sell 
goods without the promise of profits.  
Colonialism: The Introduction of a Market Society and its Effects 
The emergence of colonialism came at the same time as an all-important step forward in 
the global economy. As early as the 15th century, the materialization of a market mechanism 
caused much strife within the walls of economists and political thinkers everywhere. They 
debated how society should react to the new mechanism that changed not only economic views, 
but societal views as well. Differing perspectives on the subject usher in new ideas and ways to 
cope with the downfalls of the free market, even in the present day. Since the market is 
constantly evolving over time, economists have different views on the economy depending on 
when and where they were alive. During this drastic political change to a free market, 
economists like Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, Jean-Baptiste Say, and David Ricardo had insight 
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into this political and economic modification while it was happening. These classical political 
economists are some of the most notable, whose political and economic ideas are still applicable 
in theories about the modern market.  
David Ricardo was one of the first, and most influential Classical Political Economists. 
He was based in England, and was inspired by the father of economics himself, Adam Smith 
after reading his Wealth of Nations. He “…wrote about economic affairs when capitalism was 
emerging from feudalism to become the dominant economic system in Western Europe” 
(Stilwell 5). Ricardo’s theories on trade, distribution of income, utility, accumulation of capital, 
market equilibriums etc.… introduced in his most notable work, Principles of Political Economy 
and Taxation (1817), are crucial to economics as a whole. These ideas are directly influenced by 
those ideas of Adam Smith and Jean-Baptiste Say, both laissez-faire economists. However, 
Ricardo often criticizes those same ideas and provides alternatives. “…Ricardo was a strong 
advocate of breaking down the barriers to international trade, arguing that, if each nation 
specialized in the production of the goods and services for which it was best suited and then 
traded its surplus with other nations, all would benefit” (Stilwell 67). This is the basis of his 
famous doctrine of “comparative advantage.” Competitive advantage has since replaced the 
Ricardian comparative advantage, but Ricardo’s reasoning can still be used for an assessment of 
tariff protection and other impediments to trade. The idea of free trade makes sense, but only 
when countries involved in transactions are at similar stages of economic development. This is 
not the case usually, as developed countries must purchase raw materials and goods from 
underdeveloped former colonies. This leads to “unequal exchange,” which would only hamper 
development (Robinson 103). In the case of France and the Ivory Coast, this unequal exchange is 
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apparent, as France seeks raw goods and materials from the Ivory Coast, and sells back French 
manufactured goods at prices that prove too expensive for the Ivoirian population. 
Out of the Classical Political Economists, David Ricardo provided the most notable of 
contributions to the distribution of income among classes. He considered this issue to be “the 
principal problem in political economy.” Ricardo separated the population into three classes: 
capitalists, landowners, and workers. Capitalists receive profit, which is the reward for business 
activity, and the necessary condition for capital accumulation. Capitalists’ economic function is 
not supposed to be amassing wealth, but rather reinvesting profits and creating further rounds of 
business activity to increase the value of the capital (Stilwell 82). In the case of France and the 
Ivory Coast, French firms are the capitalists. Unfortunately, due to the access and control over 
the Ivory Coast economy given to France by the CFA Franc zone, the French “capitalists” do not 
reinvest those profits. This reduces the value of capital injections for the Ivory Coast economy 
greatly.  
Karl Polanyi, a Hungarian economist who lived about a hundred years after the Classical 
Political Economists, opposed their ideas that made the emergence of the market a natural and 
inevitable occurrence. Polanyi specified that after this “Great Transformation,” the economy 
should not be viewed as having separate pieces, but rather as one unified market society. His 
view was much more pessimistic than the Classical Political Economist, most likely because he 
had witnessed the industrial revolution in its entirety. The industrial revolution was accompanied 
by vast wealth inequality and the exploitation of the working class for individual gains. In order 
to understand the different economic principles used, one must understand the context from 
which each group of economists come. Karl Polanyi witnessed the fears of the classical political 
economists that came before him. One of the main reason for such a decline in living standards, 
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wages and general economic well-being that Polanyi witnessed was the commodification of 
labor and the use of humans as labor inputs. This deterioration of wellbeing and livelihoods via 
labor exploitation caused by market conditions is the essence of Polanyi's Satanic Mill concept - 
a hellish cycle that rips man from himself and turns his labor into a commodity, a form of social 
dislocation, and he is forced to accept it in such a market in order to receive a wage and survive. 
Polanyi believed the self-regulating market could not allow a society to exist because of the 
exploitation that would occur. In his book, The Great Transformation, he states that “a market 
economy can only exist in a market society”. But what constitutes a market society? And does 
the market economy cause a market society or the other way around? Polanyi believes that a 
government is needed to shape society because “[t]o allow the market mechanism to be the sole 
director of the fate of human beings and their natural environment, indeed, even of the amount 
and use of purchasing power, would result in the demolition of society” (Polanyi 76). While 
governments for former colonies do exist, their actions are seriously impeded by the impact that 
their former colonizers continue to have on them.  
The debate between the two economists, Amartya Sen and Jagdish Bhagwati, of how to 
solve these pertinent issues raises questions for the Indian government. Mr. Bhagwati argued that 
the Indian government should still keep its current model of development in their economy 
despite the evident issue of unequal wealth distribution, which poses great risk for the 
livelihoods of many. He was convinced that once economic growth reached a certain level, 
poverty would be able to be reduced. On the other hand, Mr. Sen thought that even if economic 
growth reached a certain level, it would not be able to reduce the poverty rate without 
government assistance.  According to Bhagwati, "only a focus on growth can yield enough 
resources for investing in social sector schemes" (Bhattacharya). Bhagwati is firmly convinced 
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that the government should not perform redistributions in order to reduce poverty, being in rapid 
economic growth. Once the unequal circumstances are improved by redistributions during a 
developing period, the capabilities of production would be "dislocated" and the patterns of 
"ordered growth" would be "jeopardized" by redistributions (Roychaudhuri et al.). Producers 
would lose incentive to do more efficient work once they have equal salaries and opportunities. 
Thus, one could recognize the ideology of working for a reward as a necessity to improving 
production efficiency. Moreover, the path of equal distribution of incomes would not be able to 
reduce the poverty rate in the long run when taking population growth into account. Once the 
population growth rate increases, the policy of equal distribution would not be feasible as it 
could not account for such a large population. As a result, those redistribution of wealth might 
cause negative economic development and “impair in the long run the ability of the state to 
sustain the expenditures required to finance the more productive direct route" (Bhagwati). In 
other words, a growing population is not conducive to a policy of social wealth distribution with 
an objective of economic growth because of the constant increase in demand for income that 
would be taking away from investment in industrial growth. In the case of the French-Ivoirian 
relationship, the economic growth that is found does not expand upon itself, due to the 
repatriation of profits. Thus, the intervention on the part of the Ivoirian government is necessary 
according to Amartya Sen. Unfortunately, this is not made possible due to the CFA Franc Zones 
and the control that France receives from it. 
Neocolonialism, Military Control, and Immigration 
 One way in which colonialism is ever-present in the world is the continued “problem” of 
immigration to developed countries. Many white French citizens are fed up with the amount of 
immigration from African nations. However, these citizens forget that it was their colonial reign 
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over Africa and their continued exploitation through the CFA Franc zones that are forcing 
Africans to immigrate to France. “Cultural links with the former metropolitan power remained 
strong, as France had long welcomed the participation of African elites in French life, for 
instance, honoring the contributions of poet (and later statesman) Léopold Senghor by naming 
him to the Académie Française and making Félix Houphoët-Boigny (later Côte d’Ivoire’s first 
president) a French cabinet minister” (Masson and Pattillo 21). This has caused the formation of 
banlieues (ghettos) on the outskirts of Paris, mostly populated by CFA Franc nationals. 
Nationalist movements have become widespread in response, most recently in France was the 
yellow vest movement. This started on the pretext of a gas tax hike, but has underlying forces of 
racism, white nationalism, as well as antisemitism. “In any case, the French government was 
keen on maintaining the monetary relationship with African countries and exerted pressures to 
induce them to continue to participate” (Masson and Pattillo 22). This was done through 
economic, political, and military means. In order to keep the pro-French bourgeoisie in power in 
the CFA Franc Zone, France used military power: “Yet, as I mentioned at the outset, the four 
critical states in the French enclave-Senegal, Ivory Coast, Cameroon and Gabon-have been kept 
under 'civilian' governments. The use of the French military presence-or special intervention-has 
been of decisive importance in bolstering these governments at their moments of greatest 
challenge: Cameroon from 1959-64, Senegal in 1959-60, Ivory Coast in 1963 and Gabon in 
1964-66” (Joseph 12). These instances of military intervention are highlighted by the use of 
inter-governmental organizations such as the United Nations and the International Monetary 
Fund.  
 While France seeks to maintain control through any means necessary, the transfer of 
capital into the CFA Franc Zone through economic development tools such as FDI and foreign 
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aid has an ulterior motive. A more recent worldwide problem has been the emigration of people 
from developing nations into developed nations. This immigration has been met with negative 
reactions from the governments and most citizens of those developed nations. In a study done by 
Sarah Bermeo and David Leblang, the relationship between migration and foreign aid is 
discussed. This may be applied to any injection of capital into an economy, including Foreign 
Direct Investment: “Long neglected by scholars of both migration and foreign aid, recent studies 
have begun to examine potential links between these two areas. Hatzipanayotou and Michael and 
Azam and Berlinschi argue that donors may use aid to decrease unwanted migration, but these 
studies do not account for policy makers' changing preferences over time. In contrast, we argue 
that the magnitude of the aid-migration relationship increases when donor preferences toward 
migration become more restrictive” (Bermeo 628). The immigration problem as it is known 
today thus cannot be solved simply through these injections of capital. Rather, an overhaul of the 
political and economic systems is needed. This mainly refers to the CFA Franc Zone, whose 
pricing favors the French economies resulting in economic downturns in CFA countries. These 
countries such as the Ivory Coast are unable to right the ship through fiscal expenditure and 
government deficit spending because of the limitations placed upon them by the CFA Franc 
Zone. This opens the path for economic development tools such as FDI and foreign aid, which 
unfortunately only serve to bolster the French economy. A change must be made to the economic 
and political systems in West Africa and the rest of the CFA Franc Zone. “Modernization 
impoverished Africa through colonialism and imperialism by the West and this trend is with us 
today as the East takes its turn to deplete the continent’s resources such as oil and minerals. 
Africa needs to outgrow poverty and underdevelopment but this may not be possible as long as 
we still believe in the power and strength of modernity at the expense of promoting new theories 
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for Africa’s development. Fighting Africa’s poverty involves much more than a simple 
displacement of the traditional society by the modern society.” (Matunhu 67)  
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